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Abstract
The recent global ﬁ  nancial crisis triggered the need to better understand the link 
between the ﬁ  nancial sector and the macroeconomy and the role of central banks 
in addressing ﬁ  nancial stability concerns, in particular regarding the interaction with 
monetary policy. This paper surveys the main contributions from the economic literature 
on this issue. There is a wide set of perspectives on how monetary policy should take 
into account ﬁ  nancial stability. Proposals range from strengthening the understanding 
and monitoring of macro-ﬁ  nancial interactions to more drastic ones that propose to 
add ﬁ  nancial stability as an additional objective for monetary policy or use monetary 
policy for ﬁ  nancial stability purposes. We conclude that given the importance of the 
ﬁ  nancial system for the monetary policy transmission mechanism, ﬁ  nancial stability 
concerns need to be taken into account in monetary policy. On the other hand, 
monetary policy, including unconventional measures, contributes to ﬁ  nancial stability 
(it is even crucial to it under certain circumstances). However, the monetary policy 
primary objective should remain focused on price stability. It should also be noted that, 
in general, price stability does not guarantee ﬁ  nancial stability and potential conﬂ  its 
between the two are highly unfavourable. Therefore, it is essential for other policies, 
in particular micro and macro-prudential ones, to maintain a close surveillance of the 
ﬁ  nancial system and, whenever needed, act to reduce the likelihood of systemic events 
and minimize the negative effects on the economy.
I. Introduction
The ﬁ  nancial turmoil that started in the summer of 2007 turned into a severe global economic and 
ﬁ  nancial crisis. The crisis made it apparent that monetary stability does not guarantee ﬁ  nancial stability 
and that ﬁ  nancial liberalisation and innovation imply that ﬁ  nance plays a bigger role in macroeconomic 
dynamics than previously thought. The recent developments triggered the need to better understand 
the link between the ﬁ  nancial sector and the macroeconomy. It also reignited the debate on how to 
rethink the role of central banks in addressing ﬁ  nancial stability concerns, in particular regarding the 
interaction with monetary policy, both in “normal” and in crisis periods. The purpose of this article is 
to discuss this issue by conducting a survey of the relevant literature.
Before analysing the interaction between ﬁ  nancial stability and monetary policy, ﬁ  rst it is necessary to 
clarify what is meant by both concepts. This is particularly the case for “ﬁ  nancial stability”, which is difﬁ  cult 
to deﬁ  ne. Schinasi (2004) emphasises that the concept of ﬁ  nancial stability is broad, encompassing the 
role of ﬁ  nancial infrastructure (legal system, ﬁ  nancial regulation, supervision and surveillance), institu-
tions and markets. According to Schinasi, a stable ﬁ  nancial system should be “capable of facilitating 
*  We are grateful to Nuno Alves, Vítor Gaspar, Ana Cristina Leal and Nuno Ribeiro for valuable comments. The 
opinions expressed in the article are those of the authors and do not necessarily coincide with those of Banco 
de Portugal or the Eurosystem. All remaining errors are those of the authors.

























































(rather than impeding) the performance of an economy and of dissipating ﬁ  nancial imbalances that 
arise endogenously or as a result of signiﬁ  cant adverse and unanticipated events”. We will take this 
deﬁ  nition as our reference for the meaning of ﬁ  nancial stability.
Monetary policy, in turn, can be seen as the institutional arrangements and the use of the monetary 
authority instruments in order to maximise social welfare. The usual monetary policy instrument is a 
short-term interest rate, which is set using open market operations and other procedures that are part 
of the central bank operational framework. The current dominant view is that, in normal times, the 
liquidity management of the central bank is not part of the monetary policy stance and the interest 
rate is the single instrument. However, in crisis periods, the central bank can use liquidity management 
actively, or make other changes to its balance sheet, that can have effects on the economy beyond the 
interest rate. Such measures are frequently called non-standard monetary policy measures. 
Similarly to ﬁ  nancial stability, monetary policy has several dimensions and also involves ﬁ  nancial infra-
structure, institutions and markets. In order for monetary policy to be effectively conducted, the central 
bank needs to have a great deal of inﬂ  uence on money market interest rates and changes in such rates 
need to be transmitted to the rest of the economy. An unstable ﬁ  nancial system would hamper the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Beyond the setting of interest rates, the broad monetary 
policy implementation framework has also important implications for the ﬁ  nancial system. Indeed, 
operational aspects, such as liquidity management, the collateral framework and the counterparties of 
monetary policy, inﬂ  uence the decisions of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries and, consequently, ﬁ  nancial stability, 
as has been clearly illustrated in the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis. Finally, communication can also be seen as a 
monetary policy tool which may inﬂ  uence ﬁ  nancial stability through its impact on agents’ expectations.
The above deﬁ  nitions highlight the clear interactions between monetary policy and ﬁ  nancial stability. 
In this article, we analyse these by ﬁ  rst examining the implications of ﬁ  nancial (in)stability for the 
monetary policy strategy, in particular regarding the question of if and how to react to asset prices and 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances. Secondly, we review the relevance of the ﬁ  nancial system for the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. Thirdly, we look at the impact of ﬁ  nancial instability on the monetary policy 
implementation. Finally, we brieﬂ  y discuss the future role of macro-prudential policy and its interaction 
with monetary policy.
II.  Implications of ﬁ  nancial (in)stability for monetary policy
II.1.  Implications for the monetary policy strategy
The monetary policy strategy should take into account issues related to ﬁ  nancial stability. However, 
there is no consensus in the literature and among practitioners regarding the best way to do this. One 
important point in this context is how to deal with asset price bubbles or misalignments. In particular, 
should the monetary authority address this issue ex post or ex ante and which elements of the monetary 
policy strategy framework should (if any) be modiﬁ  ed to integrate ﬁ  nancial and asset price stability 
issues (for example should they be taken into account in the monetary policy goals or in policy rules). 
Several perspectives have been proposed in the literature. 
II.1.1.  Asset prices in the price index objective
A simple approach to take into account asset price movements in monetary policy is to include asset 
prices in the price index that constitutes the objective of the central bank. If the central bank reaches 
its price objective then, as a corollary, also the objective of avoiding disruptive asset price movements 






















ment by Alchian and Klein (1973) who focused on “a lifetime cost of living” index as the relevant one 
from a welfare perspective. A lifetime cost of living includes not only the prices of goods purchased in 
a particular year but also expected prices of future purchases. 
The need to include prices of expected future purchases, which are very difﬁ  cult to measure, renders 
this concept impractical. Nevertheless, some authors argue that asset prices contain information about 
future price developments and so could be used as proxies of expected goods prices. Goodhart and 
Hoffmann (2000, 2002) and Goodhart (2001) proposed to replace conventional inﬂ  ation measures such 
as the CPI with a broader measure that includes housing and stock market prices with the argument that 
asset prices help to predict future consumer price inﬂ  ation. Monetary policy would target an inﬂ  ation 
measure that is given by a weighted sum of conventionally measured inﬂ  ation and asset price inﬂ  ation:
(1 )
CPI AP πα π α π =+ −
where α  is the weight on the conventional inﬂ  ation measure ()
CPI π  and () 1 α −  the weight on asset 
price inﬂ  ation ()
AP π . The use of this broader measure of inﬂ  ation as a monetary policy target implies 
that strong asset price increases could prompt tighter monetary policy even if conventionally measured 
inﬂ  ation was low and stable. 
This approach has been thoroughly debated in the academic and empirical literature and several problems 
have been identiﬁ  ed.1 First, the relationship between asset price inﬂ  ation and consumer price inﬂ  ation is 
somewhat imprecise. In particular, asset prices changes are not only related to inﬂ  ation expectations but 
are also driven inter alia by changes in fundamentals. Second, targeting asset prices might create moral 
hazard problems as it might increase risk-taking by private agents in anticipation of monetary policy 
reactions to stabilise asset prices. Third, with rational forward-looking private agents, there is the problem 
of “inﬂ  ation indeterminacy” which is the possibility of a circular relationship between monetary policy 
and asset prices: asset prices would partly determine monetary policy, while simultaneously expected 
future monetary policy determines today’s asset prices. Fourth, if the central bank targets CPI inﬂ  ation, 
taking into account all indicators of inﬂ  ationary pressure including signals from asset prices, targeting 
asset prices directly would amount to double-counting inﬂ  ationary pressure derived from asset prices. 
Fifth, the weight assigned to asset prices in a combined price index is ambiguous. Sixth, central banks 
lack sufﬁ  cient control of asset prices as in the long run asset prices are driven by fundamental factors 
and not by monetary policy. Finally, empirical analysis ﬁ  nds little evidence that including asset prices in 
an inﬂ  ation target measure would reliably improve economic outcomes.2
II.1.2.  The “benign neglect” approach to asset prices
The so-called “benign neglect” approach claims that monetary policy should focus on its primary objec-
tives – inﬂ  ation (and economic growth/employment) – and that ﬁ  nancial stability can either be addressed 
by the self discipline of the markets or by prudential regulation. Maintaining low and stable inﬂ  ation 
was seen as the main contribution monetary policy could make to ﬁ  nancial stability. Asset prices should 
only be considered to the extent that they may signal potential inﬂ  ationary or deﬂ  ationary forces. On 
analytical grounds this approach was supported by the work of Bernanke and Gertler (2001), who 
simulated different policy rules in a small scale macro model and showed theoretically and empirically 
that in case of a strong commitment to stabilizing expected inﬂ  ation, it is neither necessary nor desir-
able for monetary policy to respond to changes in asset prices, except to the extent that they help to 
forecast inﬂ  ationary or deﬂ  ationary pressures. In this context it was widely accepted that the monetary 
1  A summary of the main problems is presented in Box 4 of ECB (2005).

























































authorities should take into account information from asset prices in their assessment of the current 
state of the economy and in the forecasting exercises.3
Some experts consider that the benign neglect view was prevalent at the Fed before the ﬁ  nancial crisis. 
This view rests on three main arguments (Kohn, 2006). First, it is difﬁ  cult to clearly identify an asset 
price boom. Second, the ofﬁ  cial interest rate is considered not to be adequate to counteract asset price 
booms as the required increases in the interest rate may be too large and could destabilise the economy. 
Third, there is the conviction that when bubbles burst the effects on economic activity can be easily 
counteracted through lower interest rates. Notice that this policy is only possible if the required interest 
rate does not reach the zero lower bound. Underlying this approach is the belief in the efﬁ  ciency of 
ﬁ  nancial markets to auto-correct imbalances. Potential systemic risks from ﬁ  nancial market imperfec-
tions such as informational frictions, moral hazard and herding behaviour tend to be considered of 
second order importance compared to the cost of pricking the bubble. This type of asymmetric policy 
got to be known as the “Greenspan put”, by which the Federal Reserve did not react to the build up 
of ﬁ  nancial imbalances and responded aggressively when bubbles burst:
“We at the Federal Reserve considered a number of issues related to asset bubbles – that is, 
surges in prices of assets to unsustainable levels. As events evolved, we recognized that, despite 
our suspicions, it was very difﬁ  cult to deﬁ  nitively identify a bubble until after the fact – that is, 
when it’s bursting conﬁ  rmed its existence. Moreover, it was far from obvious that bubbles, even if 
identiﬁ  ed early, could be pre-empted short of the central bank inducing a substantial contraction 
in economic activity – the very outcome we would be seeking to avoid. Such data suggest that 
nothing short of a sharp increase in short-term rates that engenders a signiﬁ  cant economic 
retrenchment is sufﬁ  cient to check a nascent bubble. Instead, we noted in the previously cited 
mid-1999 congressional testimony the need to focus on policies to mitigate the fallout when it 
occurs and, hopefully, ease the transition to the next expansion.” – Greenspan (2002).
This strategy of “mop up after” the burst worked well in 2000-2002 when the dot.com bubble imploded, 
giving rise to the idea that it would also be successful in the future when other bubbles burst (Blinder 
and Reis, 2005). However, the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis showed that bubbles are not alike as some are more 
problematic than others. In particular, bubbles that when burst erode the balance sheets of ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries are likely to have more signiﬁ  cant economic effects and contribute further to ﬁ  nancial 
instability (Mishkin, 2008). This led to a re-examination of the Fed’s position regarding this approach, 
but not to signiﬁ  cant changes yet. In this context, FOMC members, while recognising that monetary 
policy could be used with ﬁ  nancial stability objectives, continue to defend an approach closer to “benign 
neglect” as monetary policy is still considered to be too blunt a tool. Instead, the use of other instru-
ments appears to be preferable, in particular prudential regulation:
“Given the bluntness of monetary policy as a tool for addressing developments that could lead 
to ﬁ  nancial instability, given the side effects of using policy for this purpose (including the likely 
increase in variability of inﬂ  ation and economic activity over the medium term), and given the 
need for timely policy action to realize greater beneﬁ  ts than costs in leaning against potential 
speculative excesses, my preference at this time is to use prudential regulation and supervision 
to strengthen the ﬁ  nancial system and lean against developing ﬁ  nancial imbalances.” – Kohn 
(2010).
3  However, some argued that due to the high volatility of asset prices their relative weight in central bank moni-






















II.1.3.  The “leaning against the wind” approach
Another view that has gained increased sympathy in light of the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis is the so-called 
“leaning against the wind” of asset price bubbles. The proponents of this approach argue that monetary 
policy should be used to contain or reduce an asset price bubble. In particular, monetary policy should 
be tightened in face of an inﬂ  ating asset market even if near-term inﬂ  ation pressures are not apparent 
(Cecchetti et al., 2000, 2003, Borio and White, 2003). The motivation for such a policy would be to limit 
the build-up of signiﬁ  cant asset price misalignments and the size of the eventual correction, thereby 
lowering the medium-term downside risks for the economy. Underlying this framework is the assump-
tion of non-linear effects of asset price shocks: large shocks would have a comparatively higher impact 
on the economy than small/medium shocks (Stiglitz, 2009).
One of the main criticisms of “leaning against the wind” regards the difﬁ  culty in setting a clear criterium 
for determining asset price misalignments, deﬁ  ned as deviations from a level consistent with fundamen-
tals. Those supporting the approach claim, however, that there is no need to determine with accuracy 
the degree of deviation from the fundamental value of individual assets and that it is a combination of 
developments that should raise concern.
A second criticism concerns the identiﬁ  cation of the timing of the burst and the severity of the even-
tual crisis. The challenge for policy makers becomes then to discriminate ex-ante between asset price 
booms that are likely to end up in major economic disruptions and the ones that may not. The IMF 
(2010) points out that episodes of asset price upswings, where leverage and ﬁ  nancial intermediaries 
involvement is signiﬁ  cant ,tend to deﬂ  ate with major economic disruptions since there is an interaction 
between the deterioration of borrowers and lenders balance sheet. Rising asset prices increase collat-
eral value and thus funding liquidity, which ﬁ  nances further purchases and additional price increases, 
further intensifying the cycle. Moreover, the larger the duration of a boom episode, the greater the 
likelihood of it resulting in a crisis.
A third criticism relates to the uncertainty about the impact of monetary policy on bubbles. While 
there is signiﬁ  cant evidence supporting that monetary policy has an effect on asset prices, results are 
scarce on the ability of monetary policy to have an impact on the path of a bubble. Bean et al. (2010) 
provide some tentative evidence for the US and the UK on how an aggressive “leaning against the 
wind” policy over 2003-2006 would have moderated the credit/asset price boom in these countries. 
They concluded that while this type of policy would have been effective in dampening real house price 
inﬂ  ation, the impact on real credit growth would have been relatively limited and as such it would not 
be possible to conclude that this policy would have had a major impact on the probability of a crisis 
materialising. Posen (2006) argues that the connection between monetary conditions and the rise of 
bubbles is rather tenuous given that bubbles by deﬁ  nition are not based on fundamentals but “animal 
spirits”. It has also been frequently claimed that, to have an impact on the path of a bubble the interest 
rates hike must be of a magnitude that would severely damage the economy (Blinder and Reis, 2005 
and Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach, 2010).
The proponents of “leaning against the wind” counterargue that the impact of monetary policy on 
asset prices is increased if additional monetary policy transmission channels are taken into considera-
tion, namely the “risk-taking” channel.4 Moreover, it is claimed that credible statements by monetary 
authorities of concern and determination to act could inﬂ  uence economic agents behaviour and 
moderate excesses in banking and credit markets and therefore on asset prices and spending (White, 
2009). Indeed, an important channel of inﬂ  uence over asset prices that should not be overlooked is 
that of communication regarding monetary policy. Recent studies (Lambertini et al., 2010) show that 
ﬂ  uctuations in expectations regarding monetary policy can lead to boom-bust cycles in asset prices. In 

























































particular, Lambertini et al. (2010) ﬁ  nd that unfulﬁ  lled expectations of future reductions of the monetary 
policy rate or of a rise in the inﬂ  ation target lead to a boom-bust behaviour in most macroeconomic 
variables. Therefore, central banks should follow a clear and transparent communication policy when 
dealing with the markets and should avoid, as much as possible, monetary policy surprises, in particular 
those suggesting that monetary conditions will remain loose as this seems to create the right breeding 
ground for asset price imbalances.
Different interpretations of “leaning against the wind” 
There seem to be two slightly different interpretations of the exact meaning of “leaning against the 
wind”. One is that policy makers should take into account developments in asset prices and credit when 
assessing risks to price stability, thereby implicitly leaning against asset price imbalances. Another view 
is to understand leaning against the wind as keeping interest rates higher than warranted by risks to 
price stability if there is evidence of an asset price misalignment. 
Among monetary authorities, the ECB has shown some support for the “leaning against the wind” 
approach viewed as a means of addressing risks to price stability (Trichet, 2005, 2010, ECB, 2005, 
2010). Already from its inception, the ECB has stated that it attributes a more prominent role to ﬁ  nan-
cial variables than other central banks. This is particularly evidenced by having the monetary analysis 
pillar side by side with the economic analysis one. In fact, the ECB has frequently emphasized that its 
monetary policy strategy was designed to take into account asset price developments and potential 
misalignments in the context of the monetary pillar:
«Responding to monetary and credit dynamics as part of a comprehensive assessment of the risks 
to price stability in the medium-term implies that interest rate decisions will tend to “lean against” 
accumulating ﬁ  nancial imbalances and asset price misalignments» – Trichet (2010).
Thus, from the beginning the ECB has monitored very closely the developments in money and credit. 
Nevertheless, it should also be recognised that the ECB monetary analysis has evolved over time. In the 
ﬁ  rst years of the euro, monetary analysis was primarily based on concepts derived from the quantity 
theory of money and the emphasis was more on monetary growth rather than on ﬁ  nancial imbalances 
or misalignments. Over time, however, this analysis has been broadened and deepened, recognising the 
need to have an encompassing view of the ﬁ  nancial system to better monitor the risks to price stability 
stemming from monetary and credit developments and to cross-check the economic analysis pillar. 
It should be noted that the ECB does not clearly endorse the second view on “leaning against the 
wind”, i.e., that monetary policy should be over-tightened in face of an inﬂ  ating asset market (Cecchetti 
et al., 2000, 2003, Borio and White, 2003) or should be used to ﬁ  ght illiquidity (Diamond and Rajan, 
2009).5 Instead, the ECB recognises that in certain circumstances a trade-off between short-term price 
volatility and long-term price stability may occur, but the monetary policy response should be guided 
by the longer run risks to price stability (ECB, 2010).
Implications for monetary policy frameworks 
To make the approach of “leaning against the wind” operational some reﬁ  nements in the monetary 
policy frameworks have been proposed. In particular, such an approach requires some tools to timely 
5  Diamond and Rajan (2009) suggest that when the short-term interest rate is at a low level, banks have an incen-
tive to ﬁ  nance more illiquid projects than desirable. The opposite occurs with a high interest rate. Therefore, to 
counteract these incentives, the central bank should signal a future increase in the interest rate when it is at a 






















detect asset price misalignments or other ﬁ  nancial imbalances. This could be based on the early warning 
system literature that grounds on empirical regularities of Kaminsky et al. (1998) and Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999). For instance, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Borio and Zhu (2008) and IMF (2009) present 
examples of early warning indicators of banking crisis: (i) deviation from trend of real exchange rate; (ii) 
percentage change of real housing prices;6 (iii) market risk indicators, such as the risk premium (which 
can be assessed on the basis of interest rate spreads or market volatility indicators, for example); (iv) 
percentage change of real stock prices; (v) short-term capital inﬂ  ows in percentage of GDP, current 
account balance in percentage of investment and international investment position.
This “signals approach” is a systematic exercise to deliver information as to whether an economy 
is showing one or more of the classic symptoms that emerge before a ﬁ  nancial crisis. According to 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) the massive borrowing by the US from the rest of the world prior to the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis should have been seen as a critical warning signal. The main constraint to the success of 
this approach is claimed to be the fact that policy makers and market participants may treat signals as 
irrelevant or outdated, assuming in particular that old rules of valuation no longer apply. In addition, 
in some cases policy makers may be reluctant to react due to the difﬁ  culty in predicting the timing of 
the crisis and the fact that they may be averse to commit type II errors (i.e. to react on a signal that 
turns out to be false).
II.2.  Implications of ﬁ  nancial instability for the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism
As illustrated by the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis, developments in ﬁ  nancial markets have very signiﬁ  cant effects 
on the overall economy. Given the pivotal role of the ﬁ  nancial system, a breakdown in ﬁ  nancial stability 
can disrupt the monetary policy transmission mechanism and so needs to be appropriately taken into 
account in order for the central bank to achieve its goals. On the other hand, monetary policy is not 
fully neutral from a ﬁ  nancial stability perspective.
Chart 17 shows a very simpliﬁ  ed representation of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy takes place through different channels, affecting different 
markets and variables that ultimately affect aggregate output and prices.
In a ﬁ  rst stage, policy actions, taken on the basis of the respective monetary policy strategy, directly 
inﬂ  uence economic agents’ expectations and the way these are formed. They also directly inﬂ  uence 
the ﬁ  nancial system (ﬁ  nancial intermediaries, ﬁ  nancial markets and the way they interact) which is also 
inﬂ  uenced by economic agents’ expectations.
The policy action triggers the necessary adjustments in the ﬁ  nancial system that are then reﬂ  ected in a 
set of variables that characterise monetary and ﬁ  nancial conditions, such as asset prices, interest rates, 
money and credit, the exchange rate and volatility measures. These variables, together with agents’ 
expectations, determine consumers and ﬁ   rms’ behaviour and balance sheets, and the aggregate 
outcomes in terms of inﬂ  ation, output and employment. Note that there are feedback mechanisms 
between the ﬁ  nancial system and the non-ﬁ  nancial sector which may amplify shocks. Finally, changes 
in economic activity, employment, inﬂ  ation and inﬂ  ation expectations feed back into policy decisions 
framed by the monetary policy strategy.
6 Altunbas  et al. (2009) ﬁ  nd out that in the European Union and in the US, developments in housing prices prior 
to the crisis appear to have contributed to bank risk-taking. An inﬂ  ation-adjusted house price growth rate that 
is 1 percentage point above its long-run average for six consecutive years leading up to the crisis increases the 
probability of default of the average bank by 1.5 per cent. This result is in line with the view that the housing 
market had a substantial role in the crisis and that banking distress was typically more severe in countries that 
experienced a more pronounced boom-bust cycle in house prices.

























































The recent literature has emphasised the increased importance of some monetary policy channels - such 
as the credit and the interest rate channels – and has also identiﬁ  ed new channels – namely the risk-taking 
channel. Understanding the monetary policy transmission mechanism in an encompassing way is thus 
of utmost importance to develop frameworks that better take into account ﬁ  nancial stability concerns.
Credit channel
The credit channel is one of the channels of monetary transmission that depends on a well functioning 
ﬁ  nancial system to propagate central bank interest rate policy. One can identify two main elements 
of the credit channel on the transmission of monetary policy to the rest of the economy: the bank 
lending channel and the balance sheet channel. The former focuses on the impact of monetary policy 
on the quantity of credit which banks can provide to borrowers while the latter focuses on the impact 
of monetary policy on the ﬁ  nancing ability of borrowers.
The bank lending channel is centered on the impact of monetary policy decisions on banks’ balance 
sheet and their credit supply. The ‘traditional’ view relies on quantity-induced effects of policy and the 
concept of the money multiplier. A loosening of monetary policy via an expansion in bank reserves would 
raise deposits and, consequently, the amount of bank loans. With ﬁ  nancial innovation and banking 
deregulation in the last decades, the effect of this channel has been weakening. However, in situations 
of ﬁ  nancial fragility, such as during the recent crisis, quantitative effects of monetary policy operations 
may again play a role (see section II.3).
Chart 1






















The theoretical framework of the balance sheet channel typically grounds on the ﬁ  nancial accelerator 
mechanism (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, 1995). This framework deﬁ  nes the “external ﬁ  nance premium” 
as the difference between the cost to a borrower of raising funds externally and the opportunity cost of 
internal funds. The external ﬁ  nance premium is generally positive due to market frictions and depends 
inversely on the borrower’s net worth, deﬁ  ned as the sum of the ﬁ  rm’s internal funds (liquid assets) 
and the collateral value of its illiquid assets. A deterioration of the borrower’s balance sheet position 
raises the external ﬁ  nance premium, making borrowing more costly, reducing investment and overall 
economic activity. This last result is at the center of the ﬁ  nancial accelerator. To the extent that negative 
shocks to the economy (for instance, a monetary policy contraction) reduce the net worth of borrowers 
(or positive shocks increase net worth), the spending and production effects of the initial shock will be 
ampliﬁ  ed, creating a channel through which otherwise short lived monetary, real productivity shocks 
and problems in the ﬁ  nancial sector may have long and lasting effects. An additional perspective, more   
focused more on households, is related to the existence of credit constraint which depend on the value 
of the collateral (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). In these models, shocks (productivity, for example) impact 
on asset prices, which impact households’ credit ability, amplifying the initial effect.
Traditionally, the balance sheet channel focuses on non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms’ credit constraints. More recently, 
the literature has focused on similar effects occurring on ﬁ  nancial intermediaries’ balance sheet. Disyatat 
(2010) considers it the revised bank lending channel, since it impacts the ability of credit institutions 
in providing credit to the non-ﬁ  nancial sector. Banks are credit constrained since they cannot expand 
their balance sheet indeﬁ  nitely without increasing costs. First, because there are restrictions brought 
about by the need to comply with regulatory capital requirements. Second, because banks’ (and other 
institutions providing loans) lenders demand an external ﬁ  nance premium which is negatively related 
to the banks’ capital cushion (Disyatat, 2010, Bernanke, 2007). 
Financial instability can inﬂ  uence the power of the credit channel of monetary policy, signiﬁ  cantly 
increasing the external ﬁ  nance premium, both of ﬁ  nancial intermediaries and of non-ﬁ  nancial ﬁ  rms. 
When the disturbances are on the ﬁ  nancial sector, monetary policy actions, namely an easing in interest 
rates, might have a reduced impact on the non-ﬁ  nancial sector, as ﬁ  nancial institutions may need to 
tighten credit conditions to shield their balance sheet position, thereby “absorbing” the impact of the 
monetary policy easing. By contrast, if the ﬁ  nancial system is working properly and the problems affect 
only the non-ﬁ  nancial sector, then a monetary policy easing will have a stronger effect on the economy 
than in normal times as it will tend to reduce collateral constraints.
Interest rate channel
The interest rate channel operates through the impact of ofﬁ  cial interest rate changes on real interest 
rates relevant for household and corporate spending and saving decisions. A decline in the real interest 
rate reduces the incentives for households to save and so consumption will tend to increase. At the 
same time, the real cost of capital declines which stimulates investment spending by corporations. 
This channel emphasises in particular the medium to long-term real interest rates, which are viewed as 
having the main impact on spending.
Financial instability may have several consequences in the functioning of this channel. To start with, 
ﬁ  nancial instability may make it more difﬁ  cult for the monetary authority to inﬂ  uence market interest 
rates. If these are distorted by risk premia, the central bank will ﬁ  nd it harder to ﬁ  x money market rates 
at the level it considers as appropriate. Furthermore, in order for this channel to be effective it is also 
necessary that a tightening or loosening of monetary policy is reﬂ  ected in the prices of ﬁ  nancial assets 
(bonds, equities, foreign exchange). For instance, a cut in interest rates should lead to changes in real 
interest rates, to a reduction of the incentives for households to save and to lower borrowing costs. 

























































housing. However, ﬁ  nancial instability could lead to a higher level of precautionary savings thereby 
reducing the effectiveness of monetary policy. Similarly, if asset prices are volatile then their reaction 
to changes in the central bank’s interest rates will be more difﬁ  cult to predict thereby disturbing the 
wealth effects of monetary policy.
Risk taking channel
According to recent contributions, the risk perception and tolerance of economic agents may change 
in the context of benign economic and ﬁ  nancial conditions, affecting the risk taking behaviour of 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. The link between low interest rates and ﬁ  nancial intermediaries’ risk-taking, 
points to the operation of a different channel of the monetary transmission mechanism, the so-called 
risk-taking channel. There are at least two ways in which this channel may operate. First, low returns on 
investments on safe assets may increase incentives for banks and institutional investors (such as pension 
funds) to take on more risk due to contractual or institutional commitments (for example, to meet a 
target nominal return) (Brunnermeier, 2001 and Rajan, 2005). Second, low interest rates affect asset 
price valuations and volatility, which in turn can determine adjustments in banks’ balance sheets. In 
particular, as banks tend to target leverage ratios, an increase in stock prices and in the value of banks’ 
equity encourages the expansion of their balance sheets. In this context, the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy should take the liquidity and leverage of market based ﬁ  nancial intermediaries 
explicitly into account. Financial intermediaries have an impact on ﬁ  nancial conditions, affecting real 
economic outcomes, in particular GDP components that are most sensitive to credit supply (housing 
investment, durable goods consumption).
Borio and Zhu (2008) and Adrian and Shin (2008) ﬁ  nd empirical evidence that balance sheet variables 
of ﬁ  nancial institutions have important effects on macroeconomic dynamics. In addition, they ﬁ  nd that 
expectations of an increase in the Federal funds rate target and also contemporaneous changes are 
associated with declines in investment banks assets. Gambacorta (2009), using a comprehensive data-
base of listed banks from the European Union and the United States, ﬁ  nds evidence that when interest 
rates are low for an extended period of time banks’ risk-taking tend to rise. In addition, using micro 
data for Spanish banks Jiménez et al. (2010) ﬁ  nd out that monetary policy has an impact on the level 
of risk of individual Spanish banks in two conﬂ  icting ways. In the short term, low interest rates reduce 
the probability of default of outstanding variable rate loans, by reducing the interest burden of existing 
borrowers. In the medium term, however, due to the higher collateral values and the search for yield, 
banks tend to grant loans to riskier borrowers and, in general, to soften their lending standards: they 
lend more to borrowers with bad credit histories and with more uncertain prospects. Overall, these 
results suggest that low interest rates reduce credit risk in banks’ portfolios in the short term – since 
the volume of outstanding loans is larger than the volume of new loans – but raise it in the medium 
term. These results are consistent with the existence of a risk-taking channel.
II.3.  Monetary policy implementation under ﬁ  nancial instability
The monetary policy transmission mechanism begins when the central bank sets ofﬁ  cial interest rates. 
The central bank’s ability to inﬂ  uence interest rates lies in its monopoly power to issue base money, as 
it can control the funding costs of primary liquidity and, consequently, steer short-term market interest 
rates.8 Under “normal” conditions, the central bank cannot steer both prices and quantities.9 Most 
8  We ignore cases where the central bank operates under a structural liquidity surplus, given the most common 
situation is of a structural liquidity deﬁ  cit where the central bank controls interest rates by providing liquidity to 
the ﬁ  nancial system. The liquidity deﬁ  cit is mostly determined by the demand for banknotes and reserves. 
9  Goodhart (2010) mentions that liquidity management can have a degree of freedom from interest rate policy 
even when this is above the zero lower bound. He considers that the system of interest rates corridor allows for 






















central banks aim at steering an operational target, usually a short-term interest rate, while promoting 
free and open market practices. Given the objective and strategy of monetary policy, the central bank 
monetary policy implementation is given by three elements: the deﬁ  nition of an operational target, the 
setting of the operational framework and the daily use of the instruments to attain the target (Bindseil, 
2004). The deﬁ  nition of the operational framework should take into account the impact on the ﬁ  nancial 
system and its main features.
The operational framework of monetary policy comprises three blocks: (i) the central bank balance sheet 
management, (ii) the counterparty framework and (iii) the collateral framework. The central bank balance 
sheet management involves managing the size and composition of the balance sheet. Regarding the 
size of the balance sheet, the central bank determines the overall liquidity deﬁ  cit with which it operates 
and the reserve requirements, namely their mandatory or voluntary nature, the reserve ratio and the 
remuneration. The composition of the central bank balance sheet focuses mostly on the asset side and 
is related to the choice of instruments.10 The counterparty framework deﬁ  nes the set of institutions with 
which the central bank interacts. Finally, the collateral framework deﬁ  nes the rules for ﬁ  nancial assets 
being eligible as a guarantee to central bank operations, as well as the risk management measures.
One of the fundamental functions of central banks at their origin is the lender of last resort (LLR) func-
tion, which comes from the monopoly and virtual unlimited ability to print money. According to the 
“classical” theory of the LLR (Bagehot, 1873), the central bank should be available to provide funds, 
with known rules ex-ante, to illiquid but solvent banks, at a penalty rate with adequate collateral. The 
objective of the LLR role is to guarantee ﬁ  nancial and macroeconomic stability. The credibility and wide-
spread acceptance of central bank money means that agents perceive that the central bank can provide 
liquidity to distressed institutions in order to preserve systemic stability. This role is not attainable solely 
by banking and ﬁ  nancial regulation and supervision. Therefore, there is a clear and necessary interaction 
between monetary policy (more speciﬁ  cally, the liquidity management function) and ﬁ  nancial stability 
purposes (Gaspar, 2006). This interaction is at the origins of central banking and is essential to it.
The current literature considers that there is a LLR role available for central banks when there is asym-
metric information, namely when it is difﬁ  cult to correctly evaluate ﬁ  nancial institutions’ balance sheets, 
to distinguish between solvency and liquidity, and when interbank market spreads are elevated (Freixas 
et al., 2004). This makes the LLR acting more likely to occur under stress situations.
To illustrate the broad role of the LLR, we compare the situation in a well functioning ﬁ  nancial system 
to that of a crisis period. Under normal conditions, the central bank provides liquidity such that it meets 
aggregate demand for liquidity by the banking system, in order to steer money market interest rates 
in line with policy rates. In these cases, funding markets are assumed to function properly without fric-
tions, such that individual liquidity imbalances net out in the aggregate, i.e., banks and other ﬁ  nancial 
intermediaries trade among each other and the market clears, as shown in chart 2. 
In crisis situations, counterparty risk makes individual banks’ liquidity positions matter (Heider et al., 
2009). Overall, banks prefer to hold more liquidity due to precautionary reasons, and so increase the 
price for liquidity, i.e., market interest rates. At the same time, banks perceived to be riskier may be 
excluded from market funding and transactions (e.g. Bank C in chart 3). In this case, the central bank 
has to provide more liquidity to the banking system in order to keep steering interest rates towards the 
target. Note, however, that this higher liquidity provision may not be enough to guarantee an adequate 
distribution of liquidity within the banking system. For the banking system as a whole there might be 
excess liquidity, but this may be concentrated in a group of banks, who prefer to deposit the funds in 
excess back at the central bank (at a penalty rate) than to lend to other ﬁ  nancial institutions given the 
high counterparty risk (e.g.: Bank A in chart 3). If a solvent and systemically relevant ﬁ  nancial institution 
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Chart 2
LIQUIDITY FLOWS UNDER ‘NORMAL’ MARKET CONDITIONS
is excluded from funding markets because its credit risk is perceived to be elevated, the central bank 
should intervene as LLR and avoid contagion risk to other ﬁ  nancial institutions. Note that this may imply 
the provision of liquidity to ﬁ  nancial institutions that are not regular counterparts in monetary policy 
operations. This example shows that during the crisis, the objectives of ﬁ  nancial stability and monetary 
policy become very much intertwined, as a collapse of the banking system would inevitably carry with 
it serious downside risks to price stability in a context of a seriously hampered interest rate policy. 
    When the disruptions in ﬁ  nancial intermediation are very severe, as in a major ﬁ  nancial crisis, interest 
rate policy may not be enough to counter downside risks to price stability. Once the zero lower bound 
(ZLB) is reached, liquidity management may cease to be solely geared to implementing the interest rate 
target but may also be used with monetary policy purposes (Goodhart, 2010). In these cases, monetary 
policy actions contribute both to price stability and ﬁ  nancial stability objectives and therefore becomes 
more difﬁ  cult to distinguish from macro-prudential policy.
One important instrument available to the central banks in these circumstances is credit policy which 
aims at stimulating credit to the economy by providing funds at longer maturities, for instance, by buying 
public or private debt securities thereby restoring the normal transmision mechanism of monetary policy. 
The concept of credit policy should not be confused with quantitative easing (i.e. the expansion of central 
bank money). In fact, credit policy can be implemented with or without resorting to monetary issuance. 
In addition, quantitative easing may be implemented to counteract downside risks to price stability 
but with no speciﬁ  c goal of restoring ﬁ  nancial stability or the normal ﬂ  ow of credit to the economy.
Credit policy should help reduce market interest rates, contributing to the stability of ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions and to improve the functioning of some ﬁ  nancial market segments. Central banks can provide 
credit via the banking system, via other ﬁ  nancial intermediaries or directly to the non-ﬁ  nancial sector.
In the short-run, increased central bank intermediation is very important for stabilizing the ﬁ  nancial 
system. However, in the medium to long-run, it carries greater operational and rollover risks for the 
counterparties, possible efﬁ  ciency and social costs related to moral hazard issues and the crowding-






















mention that, in the long run, increased central bank intermediation in response to ﬁ  nancial crisis can 
lead to a higher persistence of the original negative shock.
Credit policy has also potential adverse effects on ﬁ  nancial stability, since it might reduce liquidity in 
the segments for which the central bank buys the assets, or even create adverse incentives for banks 
to invest in those assets given that they rely on central bank purchases. However, these effects can be 
greatly mitigated through an appropriate design of credit policy. Given that the banking sector is able 
to better monitor debtors than the policy authorities, credit policy can also have large potential social 
costs related with moral hazard behaviour by debtors and the maintenance of inefﬁ  cient (“zombie”) 
banks and ﬁ  rms. 
Recent research has not yet provided conclusive results on the effectiveness of credit policy. Some 
authors argue that credit policy should only be activated following an increase in credit spreads which 
reﬂ  ects severe ﬁ  nancial disturbances (Cúrdia and Woodford, 2009 and 2010). Gertler and Kiyotaki 
(2010) results favour more strongly the use of credit policy in response to ﬁ  nancial shocks, with credit 
policy being able to almost eliminate the effects from ﬁ  nancial frictions. Overall, there seems to be a 
consensus that both enhanced liquidity provision and credit policy should be seen as temporary meas-
ures to be used only in crisis periods.
II    I. The future role of macro-prudential policy and its interaction with monetary 
policy 
From the discussion above, it can be concluded that monetary and ﬁ  nancial stability can be comple-
mentary. However, there are also situations in which conﬂ  icts between the two policies can arise 
(Gaspar, 2010). An example is the case when there are ﬁ  nancial frictions whose effects can be reduced 
by forfeiting the price stability goal. For instance, Di Fiore et al. (2010) ﬁ  nd that the optimal policy 
would deviate from the traditional outcomes of a simple Taylor rule when there are ﬁ  nancial frictions 
(internal and external funds are imperfect substitutes, ﬁ  rms’ assets and liabilities are denominated in 
Central Bank
Financial markets
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nominal terms and debt-contracts are not state-contingent). In particular, if there is a negative shock 
to internal funds, it is optimal to engineer a controlled period of inﬂ  ation to allow ﬁ  rms to deleverage 
and to avoid bankruptcies. 
It should be noted that the above prescriptions arise in settings when no other instrument is used to 
address ﬁ  nancial instability such as macro-prudential policy. Macro-prudential policy is here understood 
as the administrative and regulatory powers and the set of instruments aiming at ensuring ﬁ  nancial 
stability in two dimensions: (i) a robust ﬁ  nancial system able to absorb shocks without major distur-
bances to the real economy and (ii) the contention of the accumulation of systemic ﬁ  nancial risks and 
fragilities. Macro-prudential policy is thus closer to macroeconomic policy in terms of objectives but 
also closer to micro-prudential policy in terms of instruments (Bank of England, 2009). 
Several macro-prudential instruments have been put forward; for example, prudential ratios, counter-
cyclical capital buffers, loan-to-value ratios for mortgage lending, margin requirements and liquidity 
ratios. There is a strong relation between macro- and micro-prudential instruments, in the sense that 
the latter can be designed also for macro-prudential objectives. These instruments affect credit and 
asset prices and thus are likely to affect the monetary policy transmission mechanism, as shown in chart 
4 (Cohen-Cole and Morse, 2010). In turn, monetary policy inﬂ  uences ﬁ  nancial institutions decisions 
and asset prices and, consequently, ﬁ  nancial stability and the macro-prudential policy assessment (De 
Graeve et al., 2008). Thus, monetary and macro-prudential policies will need to consider each others’ 
impact, while it is also important to ensure the presence of mechanisms that facilitate the necessary 
interaction. An adequate combination of policies will necessarily depend on the speciﬁ  c situation. 
Angelini et al. (2010) ﬁ  nd that monetary policy alone leads to a better result when the economy is hit 
by supply or demand shocks. When the economy is hit by a ﬁ  nancial shock, macro-prudential policy 
is useful and coordination of policies improves total gains, coming from lower volatility in output and 
loans-to-output ratio, compensated by a larger volatility in inﬂ  ation and interest rate (according to the 
authors, monetary policy “lends a hand” to macro-prudential policy).
Although a more active macro-prudential policy and the complementarity between monetary and 
prudential policies seem to be consensual, the institutional arrangements are still not yet clear. Some 
defend that the responsibility for macro-prudential stability should be assigned to the central bank 
(Caruana, 2010).11 This would imply assigning to the central bank regulatory and supervisory powers that 
eventually will lead to the development of new structures within the central bank. Another possibility, 
that has been followed in Europe and in the US, is to assign the responsibility for macro-prudential 
stability issues to new institutions, in particular regarding the prevention and containment of systemic 
risk. In any case there are strong reasons for the involvement of central banks in these new institutions. 
In the European Union a new body – the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) – was created with the 
aim of increasing the focus on systemic risk within the framework of ﬁ  nancial supervision. The ESRB 
has two main policy tools: it can issue risk warnings and it can provide recommendations for action for 
the European Union as a whole, to one or more Member States, to one or more European Supervisory 
Authority or to one or more national supervisory authority. This new body together with the other 
three European Supervisory Authorities (European Banking Authority, European Insurance Authority 
and European Securities Authority) constitute the European System of Financial Supervision. In the 
US the Financial Stability Oversight Council was created with the task of mitigating systemic risk and 
maintaining system-wide ﬁ  nancial stability.12 The main duties are: (i) identifying threats to the ﬁ  nancial 
11 Goodhart (2010) argues in favour of a closer coordination between the Treasury and the authorities responsible 
for systemic stability, liquidity management and interest rate policy, which he considers that do not have to 
necessarily rely all with the central bank.
12 The Financial Stability Oversight Council is a new agency created together with the Ofﬁ  ce of Financial Research, 
and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection by the “Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-























THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANISM WITH MACRO-PRUDENTIAL POLICY
stability from both ﬁ  nancial and non-ﬁ  nancial organizations, (ii) promoting market discipline by elimi-
nating expectations that the Government will shield them from losses in the event of failure, and (iii) 
responding to emerging risks to the stability of the ﬁ  nancial system. The Council is an interagency body.
Whatever the institutional scheme implemented some principles of governance will have to be satisﬁ  ed 
to preserve the central bank credibility and safeguard the correct functioning of monetary policy. In 
particular, it is important to deﬁ  ne clear mandates for monetary policy and macro-prudential functions 
and effective communication policies regarding the decisions taken. There seems to be no reason to 
change the primary focus and responsibility for monetary policy on price stability, while macro-prudential 
policy should aim at strengthening the resilience of the ﬁ  nancial system to adverse real and ﬁ  nancial 
shocks and prevent the emergence of macroeconomic imbalances. In addition, given the central role 
played by the ﬁ  nancial system in the monetary policy transmission mechanism, macro-prudential deci-
sions must be taken into account by monetary policy and the exchange of information between the 
two relevant authorities should be promoted.
IV. Conclusions
The recent crisis showed that monetary policy must take into account ﬁ  nancial stability issues. The crisis 
has not, however, overturned the idea that the primary focus and responsibility of monetary policy 

























































dimension of the recent crisis, monetary policy remained highly successful in maintaining price stability.
The adjustment of the monetary policy frameworks to take into account ﬁ  nancial stability has recently 
received a lot of attention in economic policy debates. Several proposals that involve different degrees 
of changes to the conventional framework have been put forward. These proposals range from 
strengthening the understanding and monitoring of macro-ﬁ  nancial interactions to more drastic ones 
that propose to add ﬁ  nancial stability as a distinct policy objective and even the use of monetary policy 
for ﬁ  nancial stability purposes. Several efforts are being done to build models with explicit and more 
detailed ﬁ  nancial sectors. In particular, central banks have responded to the challenges posed by the 
ongoing ﬁ  nancial crisis by putting high priority on modelling the ﬁ  nancial sector, within both traditional 
and dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. These modelling efforts have mostly focused 
on including particular ﬁ  nancial variables and/or frictions, and, in some cases, on developing satellite 
models. In addition, some efforts are being done to develop complementary modelling approaches, by 
exploring alternative expectations formation mechanisms or by including heterogeneous agents within 
possibly nonlinear models. However, more fundamental research is needed regarding the development 
of macroeconomic models with complex ﬁ  nancial sectors, before their use in forecasting and policy 
analysis is feasible. 
The recent ﬁ  nancial crisis has also illustrated the importance of ﬁ  nancial stability for the monetary policy 
transmission mechanism. The recent literature emphasised the increased importance of some channels 
and has identiﬁ  ed new channels of transmission. In addition, it has also been shown that there are 
other instruments that can be used for monetary policy in crisis times beyond interest rates, which also 
contribute to ﬁ  nancial stability. These ﬁ  ndings suggest that the existing models should be enhanced to 
capture in more detail these interactions with the ﬁ  nancial system. Regarding the use of non-standard 
monetary policy measures, the consensual view is that, in normal times, there should be a complete 
separation of monetary policy from liquidity management. In crisis periods it is difﬁ  cult to disentangle 
the two and monetary policy and ﬁ  nancial stability objectives interact strongly. 
The new consensus recognises that the build-up of excesses need to be addressed by a combination 
of policies and not by monetary policy alone. In particular, macro-prudential policies, regulatory poli-
cies (e.g. loan-to-value ratios, capital requirements, liquidity ratios) and even ﬁ  scal policy should be 
enhanced to address ﬁ  nancial instability. However, it would be desirable to avoid excessive activism or 
ﬁ  ne tuning from such policies, in particular regarding credit growth and asset prices, as such measures 
could complicate the operation of monetary policy and reduce the social beneﬁ  ts from ﬁ  nancial inter-
mediation. Instead, the policies should aim at containing systemic risk on a structural basis and ensuring 
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